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Antitrust and Artificial Intelligence: A Research Agenda 
Nicolas Petit 
Since last year, the hype around “Artificial Intelligence” (“AI”) has reached the 
antitrust community.  A common thread to the emerging literature on Antitrust and AI 
(“AAI”) is to describe the increasing use of algorithms on markets as a game changer.1  
In their page turner book Virtual Competition, Professors Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice 
Stucke prophesize the “end of competition as we know it”, and advocate heightened 
government intervention. 
The AAI literature makes three claims.  First, algorithms will widen instances in which 
known forms of anticompetitive conduct occurs.  The AAI scholarship conjectures that 
express and tacit collusion as well as almost perfect behavioral discrimination will be 
more common.  Second, algorithmic markets will display new forms of anticompetitive 
conduct in non price dimensions like data capture, extraction and co-opetition 
(between “super-platforms” and applications developpers) which challenge 
established antitrust doctrine.  Third, deception is a design feature of algorithmic 
markets.  Behind the “façade” of competition, consumers are nudged in exploitative 
transactions.  In a telling metaphor, Ezrachi and Stucke compare us to the main 
character in the movie the Truman show. 
AAI literature is the closest ever our field came to science-fiction.  Like science-fiction, 
it is a lot of fun. And like science-fiction, its scenarios unearth fascinating research 
hypotheses for antitrust experts.  Five areas deserve attention.  First, the AAI literature 
essentially focuses on the facilitating role of algorithms on anticompetitive conduct.  
Those findings must now be complemented by a symmetrical investigation of the 
destabilizing effect of algorithms on harm to competition.  Take the tacit collusion 
scenarios.  The AAI literature makes a convincing case that algorithms are a plus factor 
which renders tacit collusion more stable, durable and versatile by facilitating 
detection and retaliation at lower levels of market concentration. Yet, the reciprocal 
hypothesis that oligopolists in high frequency interaction may have stronger incentives 
to cheat is given shorter shrift.  When transactions are customized – a feature of the 
digitalized economy – each bargain with a customer can be seen as a finite, one shot 
game which is incompatible with tacit collusion.  Similarly, when personalized and 
dynamic pricing are combined, the range of price points over which oligopolists must 
coordinate is virtually infinite, because it is a function of the number of individual 
customers times the number of time units spent on digital markets.  Last, when non-
price competition on privacy and behavioral discrimination are introduced, there is 
more “noise” in the market, and detecting an punishing deviations may be significantly 
more costly. 
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Second, we still lack a proper understanding of countervailing strategies.  To date, 
much of the AAI’s literature focuses on B2C markets where sellers use algorithms to 
exploit boundedly rational consumers.  But in B2B markets, sophisticated buyers may 
have ability and incentives to make or buy countermeasures that undermine the 
operation of sellers’ algorithms.  Personnally, I doubt that many car manufacturers will 
stay prey to input sellers’ algorithms, even in the extreme scenario where the later are 
super-platforms like Google, Facebook or Apple.  The dieselgate is a bitter reminder of 
the automotive industry’s technological capabilities.  And the fast development of the 
cybersecurity industry suggests a non trivial chance that we will witness the emergence 
of a market for countermeasure systems (data pertubation, masking and 
randomization sofware, for example).2 
Third, the AAI literature generates predictions on the basis of fairly strict assumptions, 
and more work is needed to understand if they are robust to circumstances.  Tacit 
collusion is conceivably easier if one postulates that rival oligopolists use similar or 
homogeneous algorithms.  Yet, as soon as the analysis is conducted under the 
assumption of algorithmic heterogeneity, a larger range of competitive outcomes 
becomes plausible.  It is indeed uncontroversial that tacit collusion is less easy when 
oligopolists display asymmetries in costs, investments, structure or market share, and 
we should attempt to understand the effects of algorithmic differentiation at preference 
specification (design) or construction (learning) stages.  To put the point differently, 
because in the real world, algorithms are neither commodities – scientific progress in 
algorithm design is relentless – nor public goods – the EU search case against Google 
brings a powerful reminder – algorithmic asymetry should be baseline hypothesis for 
antitrust policy.  The same applies to the assumption that profit-maximizing 
algorithms – unlike humans – do not fear detection and possible penalties.  True that 
unlike humans, a computer cannot be incarcerated. But if we follow the assumption 
that an algorithm does not register losses, then there is no basis to consider that it can 
register the profits of anticompetitive activity.  The point here is that a utilitarian 
algorithm is an agent that necessarily operates on behalf of someone else.  And 
therefore a reasonable assumption is that a profit-maximizing pricing algorithm will 
specify a fiduciary duty towards its vicarious governors, which will integrate 
constraints like antitrust compliance.  
Fourth, an area where additional research is needed is evidence.  Much of the early AAI 
papers report perverse instantiations of algorithmic exploitation.  An often-heard 
example is about the book “The Making of a Fly”, which sold once for $23 million on 
Amazon’s platform.  But one should not forget that customers happen to make bad 
deals on very competitive markets. And that circumstancial cases of consumer harm 
caused by pricing algorithms do not tell us much on whether market power is being 
exerted to an extent and intensity that deserves antitrust remediation.  With this, it is 
unclear if the facts advanced in AAI literature denote “a brief perturbation in 
competitive conditions” as Judge Posner once wrote, or whether they constitute 
emerging proof of a market failure worthy of agency interest.3   
                                                          
2 Ezrachi and Stucke only envision briefly « public countermeasures », and discard them as too slow to 
cope with fast moving markets. 
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Last, but not least, the main hard question raised by AAI literature relates to the goals 
of antitrust.   There remains a lot of ideological resistance in both the US and the EU 
to the idea that antitrust laws should address wealth transfers between sellers and 
buyers, and this could elevate an unsurmountable obstacle to the application of the 
competition rules to consumer exploitation through almost perfect behavioral 
discrimination and personal data extraction.  Aware of that distributional controversy, 
Ezrachi and Stucke advance an additional – and profound – idea: virtual competition 
increases the “deadweight loss by increasing distrust”.4  Presenting the social costs of 
algorithmic exploitation in trust terms is appealing.  Trust in strangers is a feature of 
modern economies.  Third-party enforcement mechanisms like the courts system, 
regulation and antitrust laws create trust and promote exchange amongst aliens.5  But 
is “trust” the core business of antitrust law?  Taxation, war or corruption all reduce 
trust, and inflict a deadweight loss on society.  Yet, few would advance the proposition 
that antitrust laws should be used to address such harms.6  In my view, the social costs 
of algorithmic exploitation can be searched closer to established antitrust theory.  
When algorithms absorb most or all consumer surplus in a relevant market, they create 
an income constraint on consumers, which shifts the demand curve inward on an 
indeterminate number of other markets.7  This, in turn, reduces the sales opportunities 
of other producers, and shrinks a range of (ir-relevant) markets, which is a deadweight 
loss.  From a policy perspective, this rationale could legitimize antitrust remediation 
against perfect behavioral discrimination (correcting for efficiencies), but would leave 
untouched personal data extraction, given the non rival and imperfectly appropriable 
nature of data (no income constraint).  
 
Most of the abovementioned issues will need to be discussed, tested and resolved 
before the scenarios of AAI literature can be integrated in policy environments.  To 
date, the EU policy makers have not yet envisioned algorithmic exploitation as an 
antitrust issue.  This does not mean that we live in a regulatory void.  Few, in our field, 
have realized that the EU is at the forefront of the discussion on the regulation of AIs.  
The new General Data Protection Regulation has introduced a right to object to “a 
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
legal effects”.8  And last month, the European Parliament has adopted a wide ranging 
resolution on civil law rules on robotics.9  
 
                                                          
4 And is thus a source of allocative inefficiency because “market economies rely on trust”.  See Ezrachi 
and Stucke, supra note 1, at 242 and 243. 
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and WJ Baer, ‘At the Turning Point : The Commission in 1978’ (1988) 7 J. public policy mark, 11-20. 
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(2011) 2(6) JECLaP, 519-520. 
8 See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4 May 
2016, 1-88, Article 22. 
9 M Vestager, ‘Algorithms and competition’, Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition, Berlin, 





But even more importantly, this does not imply that our antitrust police is passive or 
that “antritrust is dead” as Judge Posner wrily put it a week ago.10  In the EU, the legal 
doctrines of antitrust are more diverse than in the US.  Think of fluid, though little 
applied, constructs like “collective dominance”, “exploitative abuses” or even 
“concerted practices”11  Moreover, the treshold level for remedial intervention is 
notably lower than in US antitrust law.  Instead, the current observational strategy of 
the EU Commission on that front reflects a welcome commitment to evidence-based 
antitrust policy.  In March, EU Competition Commissioner Vestager said that we 
should “keep a close eye on how algorithms are developing”, and learn from early 
experiences.  She added: “We certainly shouldn't panic about the way algorithms are 
affecting markets”.  Until the technology matures, and academic research improves, 
Ms. Vestager’s humble policy position will preserve us from waging early wars at things 
that presently remain virtual market failures.   
                                                          
10 See M-Lex Report, “‘Antitrust is dead,’ US appellate judge says of agency inaction”, Antitrust Law 
Spring Meeting 2017. 
11 The Court in Eturas showed that the concept of “concerted practice” could be adjusted to cover novel 
collusion scenarios like the outsourcing of pricing decisions to an upstream algorithmic platform. See 
Case C-74/14 "Eturas" UAB and Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, EU:C:2016:42.  
